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The history of  armed conflict is rife with examples of  invading and occupying forces razing 
homes, destroying crops and poisoning water sources. Insofar as these actions purposefully tar-
get civilian populations, or are motivated by an intent to destroy peoples, or constitute inhu-
mane, disproportionate treatment, they are likely to fall under the set of  wrongs prohibited by 
international criminal law. Yet such actions are also often violations of  rights – and of  social, 
economic and cultural rights (ESCR) in particular.
The traditional view on the legal nature of  ESCR is that they are inherently vague or that they 
are mere ‘aspirational goals’ that states are to realize progressively, making them unsuitable 
for judicial application.1 For this reason, some authors claim that only violations of  civil and 
political rights can ground the international crimes set out in the Rome Statute.2 International 
criminal proceedings have tended to treat ESCR violations, even widespread violations, only as a 
background for violations against civil and political rights, rather than as independent, action-
able wrongs.3 Tellingly, however, the last decade has seen both international and national tribu-
nals recognize the relationship between the violation of  economic, social and cultural rights and 
international crimes. This recent case law, along with the practice of  various transitional justice 
mechanisms (truth commissions and the like) has opened the door to the qualification of  ESCR 
violations as crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide or other international crimes. Yet 
rigorous research into the interplay between the two fields remains scarce.4
Evelyne Schmid’s new book, Taking Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Seriously in International 
Criminal Law, aims to provide a bridge between developing practice and existing knowledge. 
At the heart of  her book lies the question of  how, or to what extent, violations of  ESCR are 
addressed in international criminal proceedings and transitional justice mechanisms. She criti-
cizes the current marginalization of  ESCR abuses in scholarship on international criminal law 
and bemoans the reality that ‘efforts to address the legacy of  widespread human rights abuses 
display a bias towards civil and political rights’ (at 10). While some have argued for an expansion 
of  international criminal law to account more directly for violations of  ESCR,5 Schmid claims 
such an expansion is unnecessary; in her view, such violations already fall within the scope of  
international crimes (at 331).
The book is divided into nine chapters, which can be roughly divided into three parts. Schmid 
uses the first two chapters following the introduction (2–3) to develop a theoretical framework 
for reading ESCR into international criminal law, to unsettle the idea that international criminal 
law is limited to civil and political rights and to elaborate on both key concepts and international 
legal obligations of  ESCR as a legal field. The next four chapters (4–7) apply the resulting theo-
retical apparatus to particular areas of  international law. The last two chapters (8–9) seek to 
1 See, e.g., Dennis and Stewart, ‘Justiciability of  ESCR’, 98(3) American Journal of  International Law (2004) 
462.
2 Ocheje, ‘Refocusing International Law on the Quest for Accountability in Africa: the Case against “Other” 
Impunity’, 15(4) Leiden Journal of  International Law (2002) 749. Rome Statute on the International 
Criminal Court 1998, 2187 UNTS 90.
3 S. Leckie and C. Huggins, Conflict and Housing, Land and Property Rights (2011), at 237; Miller, ‘Effects 
of  Invisibility’, 2 International Journal of  Transitional Justice (2008) 266; Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations and 
Economic and Social Rights’, in D. Sharp (ed.), Justice and Economic Violence in Transition (2013) 109.
4 One of  the few exceptions is G. Giacca, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict (2014).
5 Skogly, ‘Crimes against Humanity – Revisited: Is There a Role for Economic and Social Rights?’, 5(1) 
International Journal for Human Rights (2001) 58.
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connect these interpretations to broader questions in international law and international legal 
research.
Schmid’s thesis is grounded in opposition to the traditional view that ascribes ESCR a rela-
tively orphaned role in human rights law. She begins the substantive analysis, in Chapter 2, by 
revisiting the evidence against this view. For one, she points out how national and international 
case law and practice of  transitional justice mechanisms have all clarified the normative content 
of  ESC rights and the importance of  all international obligations contained in human rights law 
instruments. The growing importance of  ESCR, however, is also a result of  the development of  
international criminal law itself.
With that perspective developed, Chapters 4 to 6 take up the task of  re-reading three interna-
tional crimes in light of  ESCR: crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. In Chapter 4, 
Schmid uses a number of  judgments from international tribunals to illustrate how violations 
of  ESCR may constitute crimes against humanity. Typical of  the approach is her analysis of  a 
2014 judgment of  the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of  Cambodia (ECCC). In this case, 
the Trial Chamber convicted the accused for forcibly transferring at least two million people, of  
which between 2,000 and 20,000 died due to food shortages, absence of  water, medical care, 
accommodation and transportation (at 109). The Chamber rejected the defence’s argument 
that a prohibition of  forced transfer did not form part of  customary international law at the 
time of  the events between 1975 and 1979 and discarded the argument that food shortages and 
economic conditions in Phnom Penh justified forcible transfer.
Another illustration of  the possible overlaps between the violations of  ESCR and the crimes 
against humanity is provided by the allegations concerning Myanmar. Numerous reports 
submitted by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) documented that economic and social 
rights of  the Rohingyas, a minority in Myanmar, were being grossly violated, especially 
rights related to just and favourable conditions of  work. In 2006, the International Labour 
Organization’s Governing Body recommended that the UN Security Council refer the situa-
tion to the International Criminal Court, on the basis of  a preliminary conclusion that crimes 
against humanity had been committed (at 113). In the case of  North Korea, the UN Inquiry 
Commission extensively documented the deliberate starvation and deprivation of  detainees 
in political prison camps and concluded that these amounted to torture as a crime against 
humanity (at 158).6 A final example worth mentioning is the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Gaza Conflict, which concluded that ‘the series of  acts that deprive Palestinians in the Gaza 
Strip of  their means of  sustenance … and water could lead a competent court to find that the 
crime of  persecution, a crime against humanity, has been committed’ (at 125).7 This practice 
supports an important point made by Schmid, namely that transitional justice mechanisms 
such as inquiry commissions can find that an international crime has occurred, without identi-
fying individual perpetrators and without examining specific requirements such as the criteria 
of  the mens rea.
In Chapter  5, Schmid focuses on the ways in which violations of  ESCR can ground war 
crimes.8 The case of  crimes against property illustrates the strength of  her analysis (at 189–
198). Excessive destruction and appropriation of  protected property not justified by military 
6 North Korea Inquiry Commission, Report of  the Detailed Findings of  the Commission of  Inquiry on 
Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1, 7 February 2014, 
para.1053.
7 Final Report of  the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Doc. A/HRC/12/248, 15 September 
2009, para. 1733.
8 Schmid considers four groups of  war crimes: war crimes against persons, war crimes against property, 
war crimes consisting in the use of  prohibited methods of  warfare, and war crimes consisting in the use 
of  prohibited means of  warfare.
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necessity is a war crime both in international and non-international armed conflict. In an occu-
pied territory, Geneva Convention IV also prohibits destruction of  property belonging to private 
or public authorities (Articles 53 and 147).9 Moreover, the Hague Regulations of  1907 require 
occupying authorities to exercise their powers in the interest, including the socio-economic well-
being, of  the population living in the territory (Article 43).10 Failure to comply with this rule can 
lead to a conviction for war crimes. The destruction and appropriation of  civilian property has 
serious consequences for the enjoyment of  ESCR and may be related to the violation of  ESCR 
rights such as the right to an adequate standard of  living, including the right to housing. An 
illustration is provided by the UN Fact-Finding Mission in Gaza, which reported on the destruc-
tion of  water installations, sewage treatment, housing and other properties without military 
justification. The Mission concluded that the destruction amounted to war crimes and simul-
taneously violated human rights provisions such as the right to an adequate standard of  living 
and housing rights (at 195–196).
Chapter 6 deals with genocide and its connection with violations of  ESCR. As Schmid empha-
sizes, genocide need not be perpetrated through acts of  direct violence or ‘immediate physical 
destruction’: the deprivation of  food, water, clothing, proper housing or hygiene or the impo-
sition of  excessive work may each constitute a genocidal policy. There is no doubt that such 
deprivations can constitute the actus reus of  the crime of  genocide. The International Criminal 
Court (ICC) has confirmed, for example, that serious violations of  the right to water through the 
contamination and destruction of  water pumps can fall within the genocide definition.11 The 
more difficult question addressed by Schmid is the degree to which ESCR violations can provide 
evidence of  genocidal intent. A finding of  genocide requires the inference that actions have been 
undertaken as part of  a policy aimed at the annihilation of  a specific group of  people.
In the Akayesu case, it was accepted that such intent ‘can be inferred from a certain number 
of  presumptions of  facts’, as where ‘the general context of  the perpetration of  other culpable 
acts systematically directed against the same group, [or] the fact of  deliberately and systemati-
cally targeting victims on account of  their membership of  a particular group, while excluding 
the members of  other groups’.12 Schmid admits that establishing genocidal intent will be easier 
where a population is targeted for execution than in cases where a perpetrator calculates to 
slowly inflict ESCR violations that will ultimately lead to a group’s destruction (at 225). Yet she 
quite rightly contends that, these evidentiary issues aside, violations of  rights to food, water or 
health are not intrinsically less capable of  expressing genocidal intent than more direct viola-
tions of  the right to life.
Chapter 7 examines a number of  other international crimes that may overlap with ESCR vio-
lations, considering not only the most familiar examples – slavery, torture and apartheid – but 
also a number of  other wrongs that are defined as criminal by international law. For example, 
Schmid addresses the case of  unlawful movements of  hazardous waste (at 266–269), which is 
defined as criminal under the Basel Convention on the Control of  Transboundary Movements 
of  Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.13 In 2006, the Dutch ship Probo Koala offloaded sig-
nificant amounts of  toxic waste in Côte d’Ivoire that resulted in 17 deaths and injuries to more 
than 30,000 others. A Dutch criminal court and an Ivorian court convicted the company and 
9 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War, 12 August 1949, 75 
UNTS 287.
10 Hague Convention IV on Respecting the Laws and Customs of  War on Land and its Annex: Regulation 
concerning the Laws and Customs of  War on Land 1907, 187 CTS 227.
11 Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of  Arrest against Al Bashir, Al Bashir 
(ICC-02/05-01/09) Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 July 2010, paras 34–38.
12 ICTR, Prosecutor against Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Trial Chamber 1, 2 September 1998, para. 523.
13 Basel Convention on the Control of  Transboundary Movements of  Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 
1989, 1673 UNTS 126, Article 4.3.
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two employees guilty of  the involvement in the dumping of  waste. While no court has yet dealt 
with the possible involvement of  Ivorian authorities, in the case that Ivorian government were 
involved, Côte d’Ivoire would have violated the duty to respect the right to health and other ESCR 
(at 268).
Chapter 8 turns away from doctrinal questions of  international law and toward what Schmid 
calls the ‘corollaries’ (or normative consequences) of  qualifying ESCR violations as interna-
tional crimes. In this chapter, the key claim she develops is that international crimes and, thus, 
violations of  ESCR as well, can be prosecuted by a number of  institutions, including the ICC, 
national courts, and truth commissions and that, as a consequence, victims can be afforded 
reparation. Schmid also explores the liability of  non-state actors such as businesses and inter-
national organizations. The prohibitions of  international criminal law apply to both state and 
non-state actors and both can through the application of  international criminal law be held 
accountable for violations of  ESCR. Finally, Chapter  9 draws the conclusions and points out 
some areas for further research. For example, Schmid identifies cultural rights as an area that 
remains marginalized even in the literature on ESCR (at 333).
The book successfully challenges the assumption that violations of  ESCR do not have a place 
in international criminal law. Written with careful attention to the details of  case law and prac-
tice of  non- or quasi-judicial mechanisms, and informed by a strong position that ESCR viola-
tions properly fall within the ambit of  international criminal law, the book weaves together a 
large amount of  material in a very readable way, providing insight on both international crimi-
nal law and human rights law in the process. According to Schmid, despite their hesitation to 
consider ESCR violations in criminal proceedings, prosecutors, lawyers, NGOs and judges must 
address violations of  ESCR in the same way they consider violations of  civil and political rights.
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Modern international law of  the 21st century seems to be characterized by a farewell to the 
Westphalian understanding of  state sovereignty, by the empowerment of  the individual and by 
transnational solutions to common problems in a globalized world. This overview, however, is 
not true for Russian international law. The ‘powerful idea of  Russia’s civilizational distinctness 
from the West’ is underlying the post-Soviet practice in international law (at 190). This is the 
main thesis of  Lauri Mälksoo’s study on ‘Russian approaches to international law’. Russia was 
different, Russia is different and Russia is proud of  being different.
The author explains this thesis on the basis of  a cultural–historical approach going back 
to the culture of  late medieval Muscovy. Referring to the semiotician Yuri Lotman and the 
historian Richard Pipes, he takes up the idea that Russian culture ‘was not contractual but 
instead was based on explicitly non-contractual values’ and ‘lacked the tradition of  reci-
procity’ (at 33). He finds this line of  reasoning confirmed by writings of  present-day Russian 
internationalists such as Insur Farkhutdinov and quotes his sceptical remark: ‘All national 
systems recognize the principle pacta sunt servanda as such but they recognize it differently’ 
